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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis will analyze on one of the ways in which

disputes arising from developed countries'

investment

activities in the developing countries are decided.

The

issues of investment and disputes are of great importance to
the developed countries as well as to developing countries.

The scope of the issues gives rise to a multitude of

questions of national and international law in an

interdependent world economy.
International investment attracts the close attention
of international law because it brings the movement of

people and financial resources from one country to another
and such movement gives rise to a potential risk for

conflict between the countries.

Whereas disputes arising

from trade and financial transactions are mainly settled by

Settlement of Disputes Arising out of
Investment in Developing Countries, in SELECTED ESSAYS World
Aron Broches,

ICSID, and Other Subjects of Public and Private International Law

Bank,

458
M.

(1995)
Sornarajah,

(1994)

.

The International Law on foreign Investment,

7-8

2

means of domestic courts, the tools of international law are

often required in case of the foreign investment disputes.'
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment

Disputes

(ICSID or the Centre)

created by the Convention on

the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and

Nationals of other States

has unique dispute settlement

The jurisdiction of the Convention is limited to

mechanism.

disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other

Contracting States.

Therefore,

the increasing number of the

States that have ratified the Convention expand this

limitation of the ICSID'

s

jurisdiction and clearly

contribute to the growth of ICSID as an investment disputes
settlement institution.
The jurisdiction of the Convention is also limited by
the consent of the parties to submit a dispute to ICSID

conciliation and arbitration and the subject matter of a
dispute.

^

The experience of ICSID in the settlement of

at 8.

Id.

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, I.E.L. VIII-A
(1989)
[hereinafter ICSID Convention]
How many countries are members of ICSID? in Questions about
THE World Bank Group (visited July 15, 1997)
<http //www. worldbank org/html/extdr/f aq/extqa025 htm>
The
Convention has been signed by 13 9 States, of which 126 have
ratified the Convention.
.

:

.

.

.

.

3

disputes involving the issues of the jurisdiction of the

Convention is particularly important part of this thesis.

CHAPTER II

A.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Definitions: Nature and Structure.

It

is clear that international investments have become

a very powerful source of economic development

countries.

for many

Private international investments activity has

had different stages in its history,

from certain decades of

total rejection to other decades of being a very attractive

instrument in the international arena.

Improvements on

communication and transportation have made the world more
interdependent, a place where the international investment

wields enormous power.
There are as many definitions of a foreign investment
as the authors who research on this topic.

The definition

of the foreign investment may be broad or narrow depending

on the purpose in which it is used.

Commonly the definition

of the foreign investment is given in the context of foreign

direct investment because it is the most common of the types

Seymour J. Rubin, Introduction, in International Investment
Disputes: Avoidance and Settlement 1 (1985)
.

4

5

of investments and because of its qualitative influence on

the economy of the recipient country.

Foreign investment

may be defined as "the transfer of tangible or intangible
assets from one country to another for the purpose

of

...

generating the wealth under the total or partial control of
the owner of the assets."

One should distinguish the

content of the foreign direct investment from portfolio
The principal feature of portfolio investment

investment.

is an absence of management and control of the enterprise.

The difference is necessary in defining the limits of

protection of these two kinds of foreign investment.

An

investor usually carries his own responsibility in portfolio
investments, while the foreign direct investment has been

traditionally double protected.

The host government

protects it by erecting protecting legislation and the home
state gives diplomatic protection to its national investor.
The distinction of the extent of protection afforded to the
two types of investment is drawn from the theory that a

portfolio investments may be pulled out in a dangerous

SORNARAJAH,
^

Id.

supra note

at 4-5.

2

,

at

4

,

6

situation, whereas the direct investment does not have such

flexibility of movements.
B.

The Recent History of Foreign Investment.

The law of foreign investments,

in these circumstances,

has become one of the most intriguing and controversial

areas of international law.

As old the history of direct

international investments may be so are the number of

problems with respect to them still arise.

These problems

re-surfaced in massive numbers at the end of the Second

World War with the division of the world into two totally
different economic and social systems.

The end of

colonialism signaled a further growth in the number of
issues involving foreign investments.
a

Being colonized for

part of their history, these countries rejected any kind

of cooperation with Western countries.

The newly

independent countries agitated not only for the ending of

economic colonialism but also for a new economic order that
could permit them to lead their own economies and to an

M.M. Boguslavskiy, Pravovoe Polojenie Inostrannyh
Investiziy [Legal Status of Foreign Investments]
Vneshneeconomicheskiy Centre "SOVINTERYUR" Moscow, at 36
,

(1993)

.

SoRNARAJAH,

supra note

2,

at 1.

The cold war between super-

access to the world market.
powers,

and non-aligned movement also made their

controversial impact to the development of international
investments.

The collective actions of oil-producing

countries during the oil crisis of 1970s illustrated the

power and weakness of natural resources possession.
However,

the trend was not one-sided.

strengthening of an economy of developing

With
countries,

the

transnational companies had become tremendously powerful.
The transnational companies had already been not only

economic power but they could influence political and social

development of a country.

As a result many developing

countries considered the transnational corporation as a
threat to their sovereignty.

With the collapse of communism

in Eastern European countries and countries such as Soviet

Union as well as opening up of the remaining communist
countries namely China, Vietnam, to the world economy, the

competition for foreign investments highly increased.

One

can define the above mentioned facts as macro-challenges of

foreign investment law.

''
^^
^^

Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at

1
2

.

8

On the micro level, corporate investors have tried to

reduce their overall risk, or "variability of projected

outcomes"

,

while maintaining the total profits of their

investments.
model,

"According to the capital asset pricing

the total variability of any single investment is

composed of both systematic market risk and unsystematic or
The ability to control market risk

diversif iable risk."
is insignificant.

unsystematic risk.

However, the investor can control
For those who invest in a foreign

country's economy, the unsystematic risks consist of

political and legal challenges.

These challenges may vary

from creation of law hostile to foreign investments to the

extreme acts of the host governments such as an

expropriation or confiscation of

a

property.

The

uncertainty in a foreign country may prevent investors from
investing in this country.

It leads to losses for both the

investor and the host country.

The investor may lose his

current or future profits and the host country loses

financial resources that are significant for the economy of

David A. Lopina, The international Centre for settlement
of investment disputes investment arbitration for the
1990s, 4 Ohio St. J. of Disp. Resol
107, 108 (1988)
See id.
:

.

''

''

Id.
Id.

9

the developing country.

global measures,

Id.

at 107, 108

scenario happens in more

the entire world economy might be

unfavorably influenced

^^

If this

18

CHAPTER III

A.

THE NATURE OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES

International Investment Disputes.

International investment disputes come along with
foreign investments.

In the world of different stages of

social, economic, political and legal development,

the rise

of large number of disputes are particularly apparent.

International investment disputes have been with us in one
or the other form since the movement of people and financial

assets has started, with the result that people, their

activity and assets have become subjected to the territorial
jurisdiction of the host country.
The debate on how to determine when a legal dispute

exists have never been settled.

One of the most clearest

definitions was given by the Permanent Court of

International Investment Disputes
SELECTED ESSAYS World Bank, ICSID, and Other Subjects
Private International Law, supra note 1, 4 95 (1995)
Aron Broches,

,

in
of Public and

.

Gerhard Wegen, Dispute Settlement and Arbitration, in
International Investment Disputes: Avoidance and Settlement, supra
note 6, at 59, 62.
10

11

point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of

interests between two persons."
An international nature of the dispute does not

necessarily mean that it is a subject to public
international law.

Indeed, governments of investor

countries have sought and protected investments abroad by
their nationals through boycott, embargo and even military
sanctions.

In the context of this thesis,

the term

"international" means a relationship between a state or a
state agency and a national of another country.

The term

"investment dispute" consists of the disputes defined by
their subject matter and the area where they arise.

"In

practice, however, this term is used more particularly to

refer to disputes between a state and a foreign investor

arising out of investments by the latter in the territories
of the former,"

Id. from Mavrommatis
A, No. 2, II.
^^

Id.

''

Id.

24

at 62,

Palestine Concessions, PCIJ Series

63.

m

Investment
See also Aron Broches, Arbitration
Disputes in International Commercial Arbitration 2 92 (Schmitthoff
ed. 1967); Aron Broches, Bilateral Investment Protection
Treaties and Arbitration of Investment Disputes in The Art
OF Arbitration 63 (Schultsz and van der Berg eds
1982)
Id.

,

,

.

.

12

In the most of the cases,

investment dispute involves

the property of the investor which is located in the country
of investment.
10

-

However,

it must be noted that

in the last

20 years an increased number of investment disputes has

not involved property.

concession agreements,

Nevertheless, management contracts,
licenses, give rise to very similar

issues to those that involve real property.

2 5

These issues

are in a way related to the sovereignty of the country.

"Investment as a subject becomes a field for battle over the

validity of general principles of international law or the
Calvo doctrine,"

26

which denies the interference of the

investor state on his behalf in the affairs of the host
country. Countries are apparently very sensitive when the

delicate issue of possession of natural resources comes into
the discussion.

The ownership of the natural resources by

the foreign person located in the host country is the most

typical example of the classical investment dispute.

25

Seymour J. Rubin, Overview
Avoidance and Settlement 2 (1985)
,

''

Id.

''

Id.

28

Id.

at 2,

3

m
.

International Investment Disputes

13

Defining the nationality of the investor is often a

problem in an international investment dispute.

It

happens

when for example, transnational corporation incorporated in
the U.S. owns the shares in companies of Germany,

Switzerland

France or

and one of these European-based companies

invest in the developing country.

The experience of ICSID

shows many examples of how difficult it is sometimes to

discover the nationality of the investor.
The concern of the investor over the applicability and

implementation of the host country laws may cause a dispute
to arise.

Sometimes the future investor and the host

country establish stabilization clauses which restrict the
right of the host government to change its national laws.

A

major source of investment disputes is the change of
national law of the host country which curtails the benefits
of the foreign investor previously enjoyed.

When such a

dispute arises, neither foreign investor nor his home

government will normally accept the changes in host country
law or the actions of the host country's judicial

Broches,
'°

Id.

supra note

1,

at

4

97

14

The disputing parties may support their

authorities.^^

arguments by using one of the following documents: the

United Nations resolutions on permanent sovereignty over
natural resources
States

(1974)

,

(1962)

and economic rights and duties of

the 1967 OECD Draft Convention of the

Protection of Foreign Property, the 1976 OECD Guidelines for

Multinational Enterprises, the draft United Nations Code of
Conduct of Transnational Corporations and the Helsinki Final
Act of 1975 and its follow

B.

-

up.^^

Avoidance and Settlement of Disputes Arising Out of
Investment in Developing Countries.

There are several methods by which the investment

disputes might be settled.

However,

it would be desirable

for an investor and a host country before accepting the

decision on the investment activities, to set up and spell
out a mutual investment agreement in the way that prevents

disputes in a deal.

The best way is to set up the ideal

transaction where there will not be any irritating

''

Id.

''

Id.

15

circumstances.

As previously mentioned,

there is a point

of sensitivity towards the host country with respect to

foreign ownership of the natural resources of that
Therefore, both parties should avoid an

country.

infringement of the principle of "permanent sovereignty."

Generally the ownership benefits for the investor and
the investment benefits for the host country have a

dissuasive role with respect to disputes.

However, where

the host country's policy over natural resources is hostile
to foreign ownership,

the investor might choose to use

different methods of investment in order to avoid conflict

with the principle of "permanent sovereignty" over natural
resources.

A concession agreement is nearly equivalent to

the possession of the natural resources.

It is

based on

contractual rights to exploit the natural resources of the
host country

Rubin,
''

Id.

''

Id.

''

Id.

''

Id.

'

37

supra note 25, at

1,

5.

,

.
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Another method of decreasing the negative impact of an
investment dispute is to include,

in the agreement between

the parties, provisions recognizing that changes in

circumstances may occur, particularly during the long-term
investment agreement.

Two kinds of situations may arise.

One is expressed in the Latin maxim: rebus sic stantibus
or approximately,

changes in circumstances may change

agreements established under different conditions.
second is pacta sunt servanda

complied with.

-

The

agreements have to be

The reasonable agreement will anticipate

the possibility that disputes may arise no matter how

perfect the investment agreement is created.

In this case

the renegotiation clause might help to avert certain

disputes
One of the other methods to lessen the occurrence of

investment dispute is to agree on general conduct of parties
to international investment, particularly the conduct of

transnational corporations.

''

Id.

''

Id.

''

Id.

at 1,

6.

This can be accomplished by

17

establishment of the multilateral code or adopting bilateral
investment treaties.
The issue of settlement of investment disputes arises

when avoidance has not been made appropriately or when it
could not prevent the dispute.

Submission of the dispute

between the foreign investor and the host country to the
national court more likely will not be acceptable to either
side.

The principle of national jurisdiction will refrain

the investor to submitting the dispute to the courts of the

host country, the same argument is relevant or even more

important for the host government.

Where the local jurisdiction is not acceptable, the

parties will look for another mean of settlement of their
dispute.

Often it is an arbitration.

If it is an

arbitration, the disputing parties should choose either the

institutional arbitration or ad hoc arbitration.

When

selecting the arbitration institution each party will look
at the advantages that the arbitration institution can give.

The fact that ICSID is likely the most appropriate

institution of arbitration in investment disputes between

''

Id.
Broches,

supra note

1,

at 45 9.

18

foreign investors and host countries will be discussed in
the next chapters.

A developed country probably would

choose the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce or International

Chamber of Commerce as Western oriented arbitration
institutions, while a developing country would prefer the

regional arbitration centres of Asian African Legal

Consultative Committee such as Cairo Regional Centre for

Arbitration or Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for
Arbitration.

There are many criteria why one or the other

arbitration Centre is preferred.

They include "the nature

of the rules of the institutions,

their procedures for the

selection of arbitrators and the likely place of
arbitration" as well as the question of cost.
If the parties cannot agree on institutional

arbitration, they will have to use one of the existing set
of arbitration rules such as the UNCITRAL Rules or to create

their own rules.

This choice creates its own problems of

administration of arbitration.

See also Aron Broches, Foreign Investment and the
Settlement of Disputes with Particular Reference to ICSID,
in SELECTED ESSAYS WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF Public
AND Private International Law, supra note 1, 257 (1995).
Id.

^^

Id.

at 459-460.

^^

Id.

at 460.

19

There are several cases of investment disputes such as

British Petroleum

v.

Libya, Aramco

v.

Saudi Arabia, where

the issues of delocalised procedure and the award without

nationality have arisen.

Delocalized procedure means that

choice of law and the place of arbitration should be
different.

The international character of the award permits

the award in the dispute be out of the scrutiny of national

arbitration laws.

Developing countries have a tendency to

select the delocalized arbitration,

to avoid submitting to

the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

reasons,

There are other

applicable to both investor and the host country

why parties prefer delocalized arbitration.

They include

predictability and consistency of the arbitration rules
compared to the procedural rules of the other state in which
the arbitration will be said to be localized.

46

47

48

^^

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

at 461

CHAPTER IV

THE UTILITY OF ICSID AS AN INSTRUMENT IN

SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES

A.

Establishment of ICSID.

The idea of creating an international organization

which would regulate and promote the international
investments was under active consideration in the early
1960s.

The cause of the emergence of this idea was the

contradiction between developed and developing countries in
settling the appearing investment (disputes.
trust in each other'

s

The lack of

national judicial systems was the

main ground of controversy which was created by the epoch of
colonialism.

When there is no belief in justice of the

local jurisdiction, the dispute requires the participation
of an independent third party.

The first efforts to establish an international body to

regulate foreign investment were accomplished by the

Lopina, supra note 14 at 108-109. See also Malcolm D.
Rowat, Multilateral Approaches to Improving the Investment
Climate of Developing Countries the Cases of ICSID and
MIGA, 33 Harv. Int'l L.J. 103, 105 (1992).
,

:

20

21

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
*OECD").^^

The OECD's idea was to create a multilateral

convention on protection of foreign property and to develop
a

multilateral investment insurance organization that would

protect investment from expropriation and other risks.
The OECD abandoned its unsuccessful efforts in 1967, mainly

because the developing world was not ready to accept in a

multilateral context the rules of law set by the OECD
Convention.
The International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development

(World Bank)

also started its efforts of

creation an organization with the objective of promoting
private foreign investments in the 1960s.

First,

the

draft of the Convention on establishment of the organization

promoting foreign investment was created.

Then,

the legal

experts from 86 countries meet each other to discuss the

Convention in

4

different cities of the world.

The

Rowat, supra note 50, at 10 5.
Id. at 103, 105-106.
Id. at 103, 106. 5ee also Aron Broches, The Experience of
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, in International Investment Disputes: Avoidance and
Settlement, supra note 6 at 75, 76.
^^
Lopina, supra note 14 at 107, 108-109.

"

"
''

Id.
Id.

at 107,

109.

22

questions and concerns of these four meetings led to the
draft of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment

Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States.
The Convention is commonly known as the ICSID Convention or
the Washington Convention.

The Executive Directors of the

World Bank, on March 18, 1965, approved the draft of the
Convention for submission to the governments of countries
for the further process of signature and ratification.
The twentieth instrument of ratification was deposited on

September 14,

1966 and the Convention,

as per Section

2

of

Article 68 accordingly entered into force on October 14,
1966.

59

The International Centre for Settlement of Investment

Disputes, which the 1965 Washington Convention created,

is

an unique institution among the many institutions dealing

with arbitration and conciliation.

The special nature of

ICSID comes from the fact that it is an international

^'^'
58

The Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Some Observation on Jurisdiction, in
SELECTED ESSAYS World Bank, ICSID, and Other Subjects of Public and
Private International Law, supra note 1, at 164.
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 68. The Convention
was opened for signature on March 18, 1985, 17 U.S.T. 1270,
T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, (entered into force
Oct. 14, 1966)
The text of the Convention has also been
published in 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965).
Aron Broches,

:

.

23

organization whose framework covers the particular area of
international investment disputes between the authorities of
the host country,

which is a Contracting State to the ICSID

Convention, and the foreign private investor who is from a

State which is also a party to the Convention.
words,

In other

ICSID operates outside of the scope of domestic law

in issues necessarily involving a government entity on the

one hand and an entity under created national law (whether
it is a public law entity or private law entity)

on the

other in their relationship with respect to an investment.
In the case of ICSID,

developing countries.

most of member states consist of

Quantitative dominance of developing

countries among member countries appears to be

understandable if one takes into consideration the economic
and political power of developed countries, their intention
to invest and gain profit in developing countries and from

the other hand,

having those resources and the lack of

financial means and skills to utilize them by developing
countries.

From an economic point of view, the governments

of developing countries usually have no alternatives but to

Ahmed Sadek El-Kosheri, ICSID Arbitration and Developing
Countries, ICSID Review Foreign Investment Law Journal
Volume 8 Number 1 at 104 (1993)
.

''

Id.

.

24

create as many incentives as they can offer to attract

foreign investment.

ICSID as an international forum of

settlement of investment disputes, not subject to any

intervention of local courts,

is considered to be one of the

incentives given by developing countries to foreign
investors to look more favorably towards investing in

developing countries.

Obviously the purpose of

establishment of ICSID was not encouragement of foreign
investments in developed countries.

In the sixties,

the

developed countries already had reached economic and
political stability.

What was aimed at by the drafters of

the ICSID Convention is some protection from "non-commercial

risks" associated with less economically developed countries

which were struggling to gain political control and to
utilize their economic resources to accelerate economic and
social development.

In other words the purpose of ICSID was

to "depoliticize" the settlement of politically sensitive

4-4-62
economic matters

See Broches,

supra note 53, at 75, 77

.

25
B.

Organizational Structure.

ICSID is essentially secretariat and governed by the

Administrative Council.

Each Contracting State sends one

representative to the Administrative Council and each

representative casts one vote.

All issues which are

before the Council are decided by majority vote.

The

President of the World Bank is an ex-officio Chairman of the

Administrative Council but does not have a vote.

The

principal functions of the Administrative Council consist of
the adoption of the administrative and financial

regulations, the rules of procedure for the institution of

proceedings, rules of conciliation and arbitration.

The

Conciliation and Arbitration Rules govern the proceedings
unless the parties agree otherwise.

68

The Administrative

Council by a majority of two-thirds of its members elects

The Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, in SELECTED ESSAYS World Bank, ICSID, and Other Subjects
OF Public and Private International Law, supra note 1, at 188, 189.
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 4(1) and Art. 7(2).
^^
Id. Art. 7(2)
^'
Id. Art. 5.
^^
Broches, supra note 63, at 188, 189.
See also ICSID
Convention, supra note 4, Art. 6 (1) (a)
(b) and (c)
^^
Id. at 188, 189-190.
Aron Broches,

^'*

.

,

.
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the Secretary-General who is a principal officer of ICSID

and its registrar.
The Convention clearly states that the purpose of ICSID
is to be a Centre to administer conciliation and arbitration

of investment disputes and more generally guarantee the

practical implementation of the Convention.

However,

ICSID

does not directly conduct the settlement of the disputes.
The accomplishment of this task is left to the Arbitral

Tribunals and Conciliation Commissions which are set up

under the ICSID Convention.

Their membership consists of

persons selected from among the list of Panels of

Conciliators and Arbitrators maintained by ICSID.
13 of the

Article

Convention provides: "Each Contracting State may

designate four persons to each panel who may but need not to
be its nationals.

The Chairman may also designate ten

peirsons to each panel."

Arbitrators and conciliators are

appointed in accordance with the Convention, by the parties
to the dispute which gives the parties great latitude in

constituting the Tribunal or Commission.

However,

ICSID

will not stop the process of establishment of the

at 188, 190.
See also ICSID Convention,
Art. 10 (1)
Lopina, supra note 14, at 107, 109.
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 13.
Id.

4,
71

supra note

.
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Conciliation Commission or the Arbitral Tribunal even if the
parties fail to reach a mutual agreement.

With respect to

conciliation proceedings the only requirement is that the

Conciliation Commission should consist of a sole conciliator
or any uneven number of conciliators.

73

If the

parties

cannot agree on a number or method of appointment of

conciliators, the Convention states that the Commission

should be of three conciliators, one conciliator appointed
by each party and the third one appointed by agreement of
the parties.

In case of arbitration there is an

additional requirement that arbitrators shall not be the
same nationality neither with the Contracting State which is
a

party to a dispute nor with a national of the other

Contracting State who is also a party to a dispute.

This

requirement looses its mandatory character when the
\

arbitrators are appointed by the parties to a dispute.

7G

If the parties have failed to constitute the Commission

or Tribunal within ninety days after notice of registration
of the request for conciliation or arbitration by the

supra note 63, at 188, 190.
Id. See also ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 29(2).
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 29(3)
Id. Art. 38.
See also Broches, supra note 63, at 188, 190

Broches,
^^

^^

Id. Art.

39.

.
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Secretary-General, the Chairman of the Administrative
Council appoints the missing candidates for the Commission
or Tribunal.

The parties to a dispute may appoint

conciliators or arbitrators from outside the Panels but the
Chairman is restricted to appoint arbitrators or

conciliators only from the Panels.
Once an award is rendered,

78

it is

binding on the parties

and must be recognized by the Contracting States as if it

were a final judgment of a court in that State.

However,

the parties by applying in writing to the Secretary-General

may request interpretation,

revision,

or annulment.

These procedures are designed to ensure self-contained

operation of ICSID and its autonomy.

83

Since the effective date of the Convention, only 41
disputes, of which 10 disputes are currently pending, were

brought before ICSID, a number that barely outnumbers the
years of ICSID'

^^
^^
''^

s

existence.

The main reasons for the low

Id. Art. 3
and 38.
Id. Art. 31(1) and 40(1).
Id. at Art. 54 (1)
Id. at Art. 50 (1)
Id. at Art. 51 (1)
Id. at Art. 52 (1)
Lopina, supra note 14, at 107,
.

^°

.

^^

.

^^

.

110-111.
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The International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, 1 (visited July 15, 1997)
<http //www. worldbank org/html /extdr/ics id html>
:

.

.

.

.
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number of cases before ICSID are its relatively recent
establishment,

a

lack of publicity and amicable settlement

by the parties to the dispute/^

The 1980s and the 1990s

have witnessed a high increase in the case load of ICSID.

Thirty cases were submitted after 1981.

86

The first

explanation of this increase is a growing number of State
Parties to the Convention, which was 126 in the middle of
1997,

plus 13 more signatory States.

The second

explanation is that the growing number of cases has created
a

guide for new cases
However, the reasons commonly attributed to the fact

that there are still a limited number of cases before ICSID
is the existence of the annulment procedure set forth in

Article 52 of the Convention and the annulment proceedings
that have occurred under it.

''

''

Id.
Id.

87

See supra note 5
Kenneth S. Jacob, Re invigorating ICSID with a New Mission
and With Renewed Respect for Party Autonomy, 33 Va J. Int'l
.

L.

123,

125

(1992)

.
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C.

ICSID Procedure for the Annulment of Arbitration Awards.

One of the most positive features of arbitration is
that it provides a final binding decision within a

reasonable period of time.

Recently some decisions of ICSID

involving the annulment procedure have caused great concern

regarding ICSID'

s

This tendency in ICSID

future.

jeopardizes the finality of the award of an arbitral
tribunal and may cause legal counsels to the parties to

hesitate to advise their clients to include arbitration

under the provisions of ICSID in their contracts.

Given

that too often the cycle of award and annulment has

occurred, may well sap the vitality of ICSID.
The Convention established ICSID as in the words of

Georges Delaume "self -contained machinery functioning in
total independence from domestic laws,

prevailing at the seat of arbitration."

including the law
The role of

municipal courts in award enforcement is very limited.

Each

Contracting State has agreed to enforce the award of ICSID

®^
''

Id. at 123, 146
Id.
Georges R. Delaume,

The Convention for Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, in 2 Transn'l Cont.
booklet 17 at 37 (1990).
,

;

:
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"as if it were a final judgment of a in that State," subject

only to the local law of sovereign immunity from
execution.

In order to have some control over the self-

contained machinery of ICSID, the drafters included the

provisions on annulment based on several narrow grounds

93

Article 52(1) consist of five grounds applicable to the
annulment process
(a)

(b)

that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its

powers
that there was corruption on the part of a
member of the Tribunal;
(d) that
there has been a serious departure from a
fundamental rule of procedure; or
(e) that
the award has failed to state the reasons
on which it is based.
(c)

The language of Article 52(1)

also causes confusion

regarding annulment and appeal in the ICSID proceedings

95

The last ground appears to be the most difficult for the ad

hoc Committee to avoid the interpretation of the award as an
appeal instead of reviewing it as an annulment

.

This

ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Arts. 54, 55.
Jacob, supra note 88, at 123, 147.
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 52.
David D. Caron, Reputation and Reality in the ICSID
Annulment Process: Understanding the Distinction Between
Annulment and Appeal, ICSID Review Foreign Investment Law
Journal Volume 7 Number 1 at 37 (1992).
''

Id.

p.

38.
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confusion caused by the vague definition of the word
"failed."
a

The consequence of the inquiry whether there was

failure to state the reasons on which the award is based

is that the inquiry might easily be transferred into an

examination of the substantive correctness of the award,
thereby passing the limits of annulment inquiry and

extending its authorities to the areas of inquiry reserved
solely to appeal proceedings.

remedy is not an appeal.

Nevertheless, annulment

Therefore, under the Convention

neither a mistake in the application of the law nor a
mistake of fact can be a ground to review an award.
The annulment remedy has intended to be applied only in
r

extraordinary and narrow categories cases.

99

The

terminology of the Article, such as "manifestly exceeded"
and "serious departure" suggests that drafters of the

Convention intended to use the annulment procedure in
unusual circumstances.

For example,

in the words of

Kenneth Jacob a departure from a fundamental rule of

procedure must breach a principle of "natural justice, e.g.
that both parties must be heard and that there must be an

^^'
98
''

Jacob,

supra note 88, at 123,

147.

Id.

Rowat,

supra note 50, at 103,

114.

.

.
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adequate opportunity for rebuttal"^

^

in order to support an

annulment. The Convention drafters also emphasized that the

requirement for a reasoned award did not mean that an award
can be annulled because the arbitrators had failed to give
an answer on every issue raised by the parties.

The

history of annulment proceedings clearly indicates that
annulment should only be used in situations where there was
a

major procedural fault on the part of an arbitral

tribunal

Kenneth Jacob states that another problem related to
the annulment proceeding in ICSID is the denial of the

rights of the parties to choose the arbitrators who will
r

deal with requests for annulment.
to be annulled by the parties,

If award is requested

the Chairman of the

Administrative Council has the power to appoint an ad hoc
Committee from the Panel of Arbitrators, e.g. the annulment

procedure jeopardizes the party autonomy feature of
international arbitration."^

Jacob,

supra note 88, at 123,

148.

'°'

Id.
^" Id.
^°^
Id.

at 123, 125-126.
ICSID Convention, supra note

4,

Art.

52

(3)

.
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No annulment proceeding has occurred until 1983, when a

request was made to annul the award in Klockner
of Cameroon

To date,

have been requested,

a

v.

Republic

three more annulment proceedings

considerable number given that there

has been annually only one ICSID award.

In Klockner v.

Republic of Cameroon and Amco Asia v. Republic of Indonesia
awards were subsequently rendered in resubmitted

proceedings.

10 8

The applications by Klockner and Cameroon

for annulment of the second award were rejected.

In two

other annulment proceedings, the parties have reached an

amicable settlement of their disputes.

Despite concerns from the international arbitration
bar,

it appears that

ICSID has taken action to circumscribe

and redirect the use of annulment procedures.

For example,

the Secretary-General has successfully provided his good

offices to facilitate amicable settlement and cautioned

parties to use the procedure only within the parameters

^°^
'''

Jacob,
Caron,

supra note 88, at 123, 149.
supra note 95, at 21, 28-29.

Id.
Aron Broches,

Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards,
in SELECTED ESSAYS WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF Public
AND Private International Law, supra note 1, at 3 09.
Caron, supra note 95, at 21, 28-29.

.
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envisioned by the drafters of the Convention.

Moreover,

all the annulment decisions have been based on two of the

five grounds:

the manifest excess of powers and the failure

to state the reasons on which award is based.

If parties

could waive their rights to annul an award based on those

grounds in an agreement, the finality and legitimacy of
ICSID arbitration mechanism would be preserved.

International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes IN International Arbitration Fora, Legal Aspects of
International Trade and Investment USDOS Office of the
General Counsel, GC Legal INTLARB Section III(F) (5)
"^"^^

,

(12/20/96)
Jacob, supra note 88,
'''

Id.

at 123,

152.

CHAPTER V

THE JURISDICTION OF ICSID

The International Centre for Settlement of Investment

Disputes, as it was mentioned in the third Chapter of the
thesis, does not itself arbitrate or conciliate investment

disputes.

It does not have

jurisdictional powers in the

generally accepted meaning of this term.

The drafters

nevertheless decided to use the word "jurisdiction" to
indicate the scope of the Convention.

The use of this term

shows the extent of ICSID activities, as the administrative

organ of the Convention implementation.
The mere fact that a party ratifies the Convention does
not constitute consent to arbitration of a dispute.

114

'''

Broches,

supra note 63, at 188,

199,

Id.

The Convention
ICSID Convention, supra note 6, Preamble.
Preamble emphasizes the importance of the mutual consent of
the parties:
Recognizing that mutual consent by the parties to submit
such disputes to conciliation or to arbitration through
such facilities constitutes a binding agreement which
requires in particular that due consideration be given to
any recommendation of conciliators, and that any arbitral
award be complied with;
and
Declaring that no Contracting State shall by the mere fact
of its ratification, acceptance or approval of this
36

.

.
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According to principal Article 25(1)

the parties to an

investment dispute should fulfill three basic conditions
that constitute the necessary requirements for parties to be

eligible to use ICSID's facilities of arbitration and
conciliation:
The Jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to anylegal dispute arising directly out of an
investment, between a Contracting State (or any
constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting
State designated to the Centre by that State) and
a national of another Contracting State, which the
parties to the dispute consent in writing to
When the parties have given
submit to the Centre.
their consent, no party may withdraw its consent
(emphasis added)
unilaterally.

The fundamental condition is consent.

Consent is the

"cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Centre."

118

The

jurisdiction of ICSID is further limited by the

prerequisites of the character of the parties and by the
nature of the dispute.

119

Convention and without its consent be deemed to be under
any obligation to submit any particular dispute to
conciliation or arbitration.
^^^
118

Id. Art.

25 (1)

.

Report of the Executive Directors of the IBRD on the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States, para. 23, 4 I.L.M. 524
(1965) [hereinafter Report]
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 25(1).

.

.
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This Chapter discusses the essential significance of
the parties'

consent to submit a dispute to the Center.

The

consensual character of the Convention will then serve as a
guide to interpret the two other conditions,

first subject

matter jurisdiction and, second, the identities of the
parties

A.

Consent

1.

Binding Character.

Article 25(1),
consent,

in its formulation of the definition of

stipulates that the consent must be in written form

and must be given by both parties to the dispute.

The

decision of a State to consent to ICSID arbitration or

conciliation is a matter of pure policy of the parties.
Any Contracting State may, at the time of ratification or
any time later, notify ICSID of the class or the classes of

disputes which it would not consider submitting to ICSID.

Article 25(1) states: "The jurisdiction of the Centre
shall extend to any legal dispute
which the parties to the
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre."
Delaume, supra note 91, at 5.
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art. 25(4)
...

.

.

.
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However, when both parties have given their consent to

submit a dispute to ICSID arbitration or conciliation, no

party can withdraw its consent unilaterally.

Refusal or

abstention of one of the parties cannot prevent ICSID from
the initiation,

conduct or conclusion of the proceedings,

and the recognition and enforcement of the award.

The

guiding principle of the ICSID rulings is that once ICSID is
satisfied that it has jurisdiction over an investment
dispute,

it will process the dispute until its completion.

This is the case even if the Contracting State party to a

dispute attempts ex post facto to exclude from the

jurisdiction of ICSID classes of investment disputes or
denounces the Convention and ceases to be a Contracting
04State
i-

126

The strength of this principle was tested in Alcoa

Minerals of Jamaica, Inc.

^" Id. Art.

v.

Government of Jamaica.

The

25(1)

supra note 91, at 8.
William Rand et al
ICSID' s Emerging Jurisprudence: the
Scope of ICSID' s Jurisdiction, 19 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol.
Delaume,

.

33,

,

53 (1986)
Delaume, supra note 91, at 8.
Discussed in John T. Schmidt,

Arbitration Under the
Auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID)
Implications of the Decision on
Jurisdiction in Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v.
Government of Jamaica, 17 Harv. Int'l L.J. 90 (1976).
The
:

.
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dispute arose out of a long term agreement between Alcoa

Minerals of Jamaica,

Inc.

(Alcoa),

an American corporation

and the Government of Jamaica (Jamaica)

.

In 1968,

Alcoa

undertook to construct an aluminum refining plant in Jamaica
in return of tax concessions and long-term leases for the

mining of bauxite.

.

arbitration clause.
bauxite mining.

The agreement contained an ICSID
In 1974,

Jamaica imposed a new tax on

Considering a new tax a violation of the

1968 investment agreement, Alcoa initiated ICSID
r

arbitration.

Jamaica refused to appear at the arbitration

proceeding, relying on a reservation to ICSID'

s

jurisdiction

under Article 25 that Jamaica notified ICSID that "[IJegal
dispute arising directly out of an investment relating to

minerals or other natural resources"

"...at

not be submitted to ICSID arbitration.

any

time..."

could

This notification

footnote 8 of John T. Schmidt article states that Alcoa v.
Jamaica case is:
Unpublished Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence of
Arbitral Tribunal, International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) ARB 74/2 (1975) [hereinafter
Decision]
Under art. 48(5) of the Convention and reg.
21(1) of the ICSID Administrative and Financial
Regulations, ICSID cannot publish the text of an arbitral
award unless both parties to the arbitration agree
thereto
.

^''
^^^

Id.
Id.

at 91.
at 95 and 102.
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was made shortly before enactment of the law increasing the
tax on bauxite mining.
The Tribunal applied Article 45 of the Convention

empowering the Tribunal to render an enforceable award on
the merits of an investment dispute.

The tribunal

enforced the prohibition on unilateral withdrawal of consent
by Jamaica and held Jamaica to the original investment
agreement, ruling that:
In the present case the written consent was
contained in the arbitration clause between the
Government and Alcoa.... [T] his consent having been
given could not be withdrawn. The notification
under Article 25 only operates for the future by
way of information to the Centre and potential
future investors in undertakings concerning
minerals and other natural resources of Jamaica.

Id. at 95.
See also ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art.
45.
It provides:
Failure of a party to appear or to present his case
(1)

shall not be deemed an admission of the other party's
assertion.
If a party fails to appear or to present his case at
(2)
any stage of the proceedings the other party may request
the Tribunal to deal with the questions submitted to it
and to render an award.
Before rendering an award, the
Tribunal shall notify, and grant a period of grace to, the
party failing to appear or to present its case, unless it
is satisfied that that party does not intend to do so.
Rand, supra note 125, at 33, 53.
See also Schmidt, supra
note 127, at 90, 103.

:

.
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The Forms of Consent.

2.

The Convention does not specify the manner in which the

consent should be given.

In most of the cases consent is

expressed in the conciliation/arbitration clause of an
investment agreement.

13 2

Comments on the forms of party

consent was given in the Report

Consent might be given, for example, in a clause
included in an investment agreement, providing for
the submission to the Centre of future disputes
arising out of that agreement, or in a compromis
regarding a dispute which has already arisen. Nor
does the Convention require that the consent of
both parties be expressed in a single instrument.
Thus, a host State might in its investment
promotion legislation offer to submit disputes
arising out of certain classes of investments to
the jurisdiction of the Centre, and the investor
might give his consent by accepting the offer in
...
133
writing.

The Arbitral Tribunal in its decision in Amco-Asia et
al

.

V.

the Republic of Indonesia

dealt with an issue of

the form in which consent should be given.

The Republic of

Indonesia objected to ICSID's jurisdiction and requested the

132

Delaume, supra note 91, at 6.
Report, supra note 118, para. 24.
International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Arbitral Tribunal: Award on Jurisdiction in the
Matter of the Arbitration between Amco Asia Corporation et
al
and Indonesia September 25, 1983, 23 I.L.M. 351, 359
(1984) [hereinafter Amco]
.
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Tribunal to determine whether article

9

of the investment

application constituted a valid and effective consent to
treat P.T. Amco, as a United States national for the

purposes of the Convention.

The Tribunal dealt with

Indonesia's argument that article

9

did not contain the

words of express agreement required by the article 25 of the
The Tribunal concluded that,

Convention.

"a

convention to

arbitrate is not to be construed restrictively, nor, as a

matter of fact, broadly or liberally.
in a way

...

construed

It is to be

to find out and to respect the common will of the

parties" with "application of the principle pacta sunt
servanda."

Article

of an express clause,

25

does not have any formal requisite

the Tribunal declaredargued.

,

and at

the date on which the parties consented to submit possible

future disputes to arbitration, the Republic of Indonesia

had knowledge that P.T. Amco was under the foreign control.
Consequently, the Tribunal held that Indonesia had consented
to ICSID arbitration and the Tribunal had jurisdiction over

the dispute.

'''

^''
^^^

Id.
Id.
Id.

at 360.
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The United States Government,

ambiguity in the notion of consent,

in order to avoid

included an express

clause in its 1994 U.S. prototype bilateral investment

treaty (BIT) which satisfies the United States' principal

objectives in bilateral investment treaty negotiations.
The BIT between the U.S. and Uzbekistan,

for instance,

specifies that:

Each party hereby consents to the submission of
any investment dispute for settlement by binding
arbitration.... [T] his consent and the submission of
the dispute by a national or company under
paragraph 3(a) shall satisfy the requirement of:
(a) Chapter
II of the ICSID Convention
(Jurisdiction of the Centre)..."

In an increasing number of instances,

bilateral

treaties regarding the promotion and the protection of

investments represent one of the forms of investment laws
that make reference to ICSID facilities for the settlement
of investment disputes between the Contracting State and the

national of another Contracting State.

^^^

Investment Treaty with Uzbekistan, 1994 WL 896767

(Treaty)

at 2.

Treaty between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, in Investment Treaty with Uzbekistan, supra note
22, Art. IX (4) [hereinafter Treaty].
Delaume, supra note 91, at 12.
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Such reference may take the form of exclusive choice by
an investor,

institutions,
facilities.

among the options of dispute-resolution

including a primary recourse to ICSID
This treaty presents an original feature of

willingness of the host country to accept the choice of an
investor as to whether an investment dispute will be

submitted to ICSID arbitration.
Some bilateral treaties include provisions that upon
the request of the investor,

an investment agreement between

an investor who is a national of one of the Contracting

States and another Contracting State will include provisions

referring to arbitration and conciliation under ICSID.
Such provisions give assurance to an investor that arising
investment disputes can be submitted to ICSID.
In order to improve the investment climate and

accordingly to attract private foreign investments, some
countries include ICSID arbitration/conciliation procedures
in their investment laws as a possible means of dispute

settlement with foreign investor.

In connection to the

consent in national investment laws, the Report provided

^''^

5,
^^^

supra note 139, Art. IX(3).
Treaty between France and Malaysia, April 24, 1975 Art.
Investment Treaties Year 1975, p. 9.

Treaty,

,

Id.

at 10.
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that the host state might unilaterally offer to submit

certain types of investment disputes to the

arbitration/conciliation of ICSID, and the investor might
give his consent by accepting the offer in writing either in
an investment agreement or in a statement that he agrees to

submit particular disputes to ICSID.
the moment of acceptance has occurred,

rise to controversy.

The issue of when

continues to give

According to Georges Delaume, the

investor might accept the host state's offer

"...at

of the investment or at any time thereafter,

including at

the time

the time that the investor would file a request for

conciliation/arbitration with the ICSID Secretariat.""^
Another view is represented by Aron Broches

.

He

emphasizes the differences in the language of the host state
offer as expressed in its investment law.

In some cases,

the language of investment law might require that acceptance
is to be given by the investor before the approval of the

investment.

This situation obliges the investor to accept

the offer of the host state in order to acquire an approval
of the host country for fulfillment of investment project

Report,
Delaume,
Broches,
'''

Id.

supra note 118, para. 24.
supra note 91, at 10.
supra note 58, at 164, 169.

47

and also to be eligible for the ICSID dispute settlement

mechanism.
In other cases,

the language of the investment law does

not specify an acceptance time at all.

This might raise the

question of whether the requirements of Article 25(1) are
satisfied in the absence of the written consent of the
investor.

However,

in this situation the investor may

rely on two other forms to express consent.

First,

reliance

on provisions of a bilateral treaty between the investor's

country and the host country. Second, the investor may
include an ICSID arbitration clause in the investment
agreement.

The latter approach seems to be the most

reliable choice to express consent to ICSID.

Regardless of

the form in which the consent might be given,

it would be

beneficial from the point of view of the Host State as well
as of that of the investor to avoid ambiguity and to spell

out clearly the provisions of their mutual consent.

'''

Id.

.
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B.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

In order to submit the dispute to the jurisdiction of

ICSID,

the dispute should be of legal origin and arise from

an investment.

The drafters of the Convention did not

provide a definition of either legal dispute or of
investment.

This subchapter will discuss the rationale

behind the decision of the Convention drafters, and will
also analyze the range of the expression "legal dispute" and
the term "investment"

1.

Legal Dispute.

According to the Report of the Executive Directors of
EBRD on the Convention, the purpose of the expression "legal
dispute" was to limit the scope of ICSID to disputes

involving the existence or scope of a legal right or duty.
The Report states that the expression "legal dispute"

clarifies that the disputes of "...conflicts of

rights..."

within the jurisdictional limits of ICSID while

ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art.
Rand, supra note 12 5, at 33, 35.
Report, supra note 118, para. 26.

25(1)

"...mere

are
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conflicts of interests are not."

lb2

The Report adds that

"[t]he dispute must concern the existence or scope of a
legal right or obligation, or the nature or extent of the

reparation to be made for breach of a legal obligation."
The legal dispute limits the scope of ICSID to disputes that

concern the corresponding rights and obligations of the
parties, as those presented in an investment agreement and
the relevant laws regulating an investment agreement.

It

includes allegations of non-performance, violation of

"stabilization clauses" and nationalization and
expropriation.

For example,

in Amco-Asia et al

.

v.

the

Republic of Indonesia, the legal dispute consisted of claims
of Amco-Asia such as unlawful expropriation,

ouster by

Indonesian army and police, of their right to operate and

manage the hotel for thirty years, breach of contract, and
unjust enrichment.

^" Id.
^" Id.

supra note 91, at 29.
Christopher M. Koa, The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and Dispute Resolution:
Conciliating and Arbitrating with China through the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
24 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 439, 451 (1991).
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes In the Matter of the Arbitration between Amco Asia
Corp. and Others and the Republic of Indonesia Award on the
Merits, 24 I.L.M. 1022, 1024 (1985).
Delaume,

.
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2.

The Notion of Investment.

Neither the history of the Convention, nor Article
provides a precise definition of the term

25(1)

"investment", even if the term has a significant importance
for implementation of the Convention.

The reasons for the lack of a precise definition of

investment in the Convention is based on three practical
considerations.

A detailed definition of the term

"investment" as it is given in investment codes or BITs

would be too broad to be useful.

On the other hand a

precise and short definition would have been difficult,
not impossible,

if

considering the different definition of the

term "investment" given by one country or group of
countries.

It could also restrict the

jurisdiction of

ICSID by giving a strict definition of the investment which

would limit the access of disputes to the jurisdiction of

Delaume,
'''
159

supra note 91, at 30.

Id.

Treaty, supra note 13 9, Art. 1(d) gives a comprehensive
definition of the forms of economic activity covered by the
term "investment"
Broches, supra note 63, at 188, 208.
See also Delaume,
supra note 91, at 30.
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ICSID even if the parties would consider a dispute as a

genuine "investment" dispute.

Finally,

in view of the

requirement that the mutual consent of the parties should be
given to submit a dispute to ICSID proceedings, the drafters

decided that the best solution was to leave the

characterization of the nature of their relationship and of
relating disputes to the parties.

16 2

The lack of a definition of investment was beneficial
for the implementation of the Convention in view of the

changes that have happened in international investment

activities since the time of establishment of ICSID.

The

Convention was drafted at a time when most investments took
the form of concessions,

loans or joint ventures, while

nowadays investments are taking new forms, such as; service
and management contracts, and agreements for the transfer of

know-how and of technology.

By granting parties the

supra note 91, at 30.
Id.
See also Report, supra note 118, para. 27:
No attempt was made to define the term "investment" given
the essential requirement of consent by the parties, and
the mechanism through which Contracting States can make
known in Advance, if they so desire, the classes of
disputes which they would or would not consider submitting
to the Centre (Article 25 (4)).
Treaty, supra note 13 9, Art. 1(d) includes investment in
the form of contractual rights, such as under turnkey,
construction of management contracts; intellectual property,
including copyrights, patents, trade secrets, including
Delaume,
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freedom to characterize the term "investment", the

Convention has become more flexible to encompass new forms
of investment activity.

The concepts of "legal dispute" and "investment" were

designed to be rarely challenged and easily satisfy the
subject matter requirements.

So far,

the disputes that have

been raised before the ICSID tribunal concerning an issue of
the ICSID jurisdiction have been limited to those based on

claims of lack of consent and/or the failure to meet the

nationality requirement.
However,

the

ICSID Tribunal sua sponte raised the

issue of subject matter jurisdiction in Alcoa

v.

Jamaica.

The Tribunal first concluded that the dispute between Alcoa

and Jamaica is legal because it concerned the extent of the
parties'

legal rights and obligations under their 1968

investment agreement.

The Tribunal also relied on

arbitral precedents involving claims that by passage of

legislation a state violated contractual obligations owed to
an alien, necessarily stand for the proposition that such

know-how and confidential business information; as well as
established forms of investment.
Delaume, supra note 91, at 35.
^^^
Schmidt, supra note 127, at 90, 95-96.
^^^

Id.

at 90,

98-99.
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cases are justiciable legal disputes.

16 7

Next,

the Tribunal

discussed the question whether the dispute involved an
investment issue.

The Tribunal found that the economic

activities of Alcoa in Jamaica were in the ordinary meaning
of the term "investment"
a

.

It stated that a case

mining company invested substantial amounts in

in which

"...

a

foreign

state in reliance upon an agreement with that State,

among those contemplated by the Convention."

16 8

is

It further

noted that the parties consent to ICSID arbitration itself
indicated that the economic relationship of the host State
and an investor was investment related.

16

9

The changes in investment codes, bilateral investment

treaties and the precedents of ICSID arbitration permit the

conclusion that generally in the context of contemporary
thinking, an economic concept of investment is progressively

substituting itself for the traditional notion of investment
of capital.

Today the notion of investment is directly

related to the expected contribution to the economy of the
State concerned by the association of the resources of an

^^^
'''
^^^

Id. at 90, 99.
Id.
Id. at 90, 100.
Delaume, supra note 91,

at 31
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investor and the host State.

It gives a new meaning to

the Convention and widen its jurisdiction.

C.

The Identity of the Parties.

The machinery of the ICSID Convention was created with
the purpose of establishing a specialized international

forum particularly well suited to take into consideration
the respective rights of investors as nationals of a

Contracting State and other Contracting States.

The

limitation of the scope of the Convention to disputes

between nationals of a Contracting State on the one hand and
the Contracting State on the other hand excludes from the

scope of the Convention disputes between international
persons,

i.e.

both states and international organizations,

for which there exists traditional methods of settlement

under international law.

Disputes between private law

persons can be solved through recourse to the national
courts or commercial arbitration.

Subject to the

limitation of juridical persons such as corporations, the

'''
'''
'^'

Id.
Id.
Id.

at 14.

Broches,

supra note 63, at 188, 201.

.

.
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scope of the Convention also excludes disputes between a

Contracting State and its own nationals.

1.

The Identity of the Investor.

Article 25(1) of the Convention requires that one of
the parties be "a national of another Contracting State.

The Convention clearly states that national of another

Contracting State can be juridical or natural person which
has "the nationality of a Contracting State other than the

State party to the dispute."
In regard to natural persons, Article 25(2)

(a)

provides

that the nationality requirement must be met both at the

time when the parties consented to submit a dispute to

conciliation or arbitration as well as on the date on which
the request for conciliation or arbitration was

registered.

""

Further, Article 25(2)

(a)

excludes from the

definition of "national of another Contracting State" the
situation when a person, on either of the relevant dates, is

ICSID Convention,
Id. Art. 25 (2)
^" Id. Art. 25(2) (a)
^^^

.

supra note

4,

Art.

25(1)

.
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a national of both

Contracting States party to the

dispute

With respect to juridical persons, Article 25(2)

(b)

defines the "national of another Contracting State" as:
"any juridical person who had the nationality of a
Contracting State other than the State party to
the dispute on the date on which the parties
consented to submit such dispute to conciliation
or arbitration..."

Generally the nationality test of juridical persons is
based on the notion of the place of incorporation or ^^siege

Authority for the nationality test can be found

social."

in the award in the arbitration between Amco-Asia v.

Republic of Indonesia, in which the Tribunal decided the
issue of Amco-Asia'

s

nationality on the grounds of the place

of incorporation.

Although

a test of

nationality based on the place of

incorporation is a principle, the principle is qualified by
the final clause of Article 25(2)

(a)

.

According to this

provision, the juridical person incorporated in the host

'''
^""^

Id.
Id. Art.

25

(2) (b)

.

supra note 91, at 15.
supra note 134, at 351,

Delaume,
181

Amco,

361
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Contracting State might be considered as the national of
another Contracting State if:
because of foreign control, the parties have
agreed [juridical person] should be treated as
national of another Contracting State for the
18 2
purposes of the Convention.
...

Article 25(2)

(b)

a

was designed to allow the

implementation of jurisdiction over all necessary parties to
a dispute in situations where foreign investments had been

transferred through a locally- incorporated entity.

It is

quite usual for the host State, especially in case of a

developing country, to require that the foreign entity
operate its business within the territory of the host State,

through an entity organized under the laws of the host
State.

This clause is a necessary exception to the

general rule that ICSID will not have jurisdiction over the

disputes between a Contracting State and its own
nationals.

18 5

If no exceptions were made for foreign-

controlled but locally-incorporated entities, a significant

183

'''

ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Art.
supra note 12 5, at 33, 46.
Broches, supra note 63, at 188, 205.
Rand,
Id.

25

(2) (b)
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and important sector of foreign investments would be outside
the jurisdiction of the Convention,
In certain cases,
a local

company will have the nationality of only one

Contracting State.
simple.

an investor or investors controlling

This makes the test on nationality

All that needs to be done is to identify the

Contracting State of which the investors are nationals.
In some cases,

the situation is more complex,

such as when

the local entity is controlled not by a single investor,

or

investors of the same nationality, but by a group of

companies of different nationalities with the goal to
combine the financial resources for the joint ventures.
This situation requires additional precision from the

parties in their investment agreement.
The exception to the nationality requirement and

multiple participants in the joint venture were the subject
of extensive attention in the first "World Bank" arbitration

m

Holiday Inns.

Morocco.

v.

18 9

This arbitration arose out

of a 1966 joint venture agreement between the Government of

'''

187
'''

Id.
Delaume,

Id.

supra note 91, at 16.

at 17.

Pierre Lalive, The first ^World Bank' arbitration
(Holiday Inns. v. Morocco) - -some legal problems Brit. Y.B
Int'l L. 123 (1980)
,

.
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Morocco, on the one side, and two U.S. companies. Occidental

Petroleum Corporation and Holiday Inns, on the other,
the construction of four hotels in Morocco.

for

The problem was

that these two companies were not signatories of the joint

venture.

Instead,

the signatories were the Swiss subsidiary

of Holiday Inns and the subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum

Corporation.

Neither of signatories was in existence on the

date of execution of the agreement.
The Government of Morocco objected to the arbitral

tribunal's jurisdiction over the locally-incorporated
H.I.S.A. companies on the ground that Morocco had never

agreed in writing to treat these companies as nationals of
another Contracting State within the Article 25(2)
exception.'^

(b)

The tribunal stated that an exception should

normally be explicitly included in an agreement.
the tribunal specified that:

"

[A]

However,

n implied agreement would

only be acceptable in the event that the specific

circumstances would exclude any other interpretation of the
intention of the parties, which is not the case here."
The tribunal concluded that the Government of Morocco itself

had requested the foreign companies to form the companies in

^^°

^^^

Id.
Id.

at 123,
at 123,

138-139
141.

s
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question and at all times treated the H.I.S.A. companies as
alter egos of their foreign parent companies.'''^
The tribunal's decision appears to be the confirmation
of the notion that exception under the Article 25(2)

(b)

constitutes a departure from the traditional rules of
international law preventing nationals from suing their own
state internationally.

193

The tribunal obviously considered

that the creation of locally-incorporated entities is

frequently a necessary to foreign investments and that the
Article 25(2)

(b)

exception was designed to permit the

jurisdiction of ICSID over disputes arising in connection
with the activities of these entities.

2.

The Identity of the Contracting State.

Article 25(1) of the Convention requires that one party
be a Contracting State or a "constituent subdivision or

agency" of a Contracting State.

The issue of a Contracting

State's membership date was also discussed in Holiday Inns
The Government of Morocco objected to ICSID'

V.

Morocco.

^^^

at 123,140-141.
Rand, supra note 125,

'''

Id.

Id.

Lalive,

at 33,

47.

supra note 189, at 123.
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jurisdiction over Swiss subsidiary of Holiday Inns that had
signed the investment agreement containing recourse to ICSID

arbitration and conciliation.

19 6

One of the reasons for the

objection was that Switzerland was not yet a Contracting
State at the time of the execution of the agreement.

The

tribunal disposed of Morocco's objection by ruling that

parties can reserve the effectiveness of their arbitration
clause to the occurrence of certain events,

including the

Although

adherence of relevant states to the Convention.

the tribunal's decision concerned the foreign investor

rather than the host country,

it provided the principle that

the status of Contracting State is determined by the date of

submission of the dispute to ICSID, rather than the date
when the parties concluded an investment agreement.

Under Article 25(1) of the Convention, each Contracting
State has a right to designate to ICSID its particular

public entities of which it considers eligible to be parties
to arbitration or conciliation proceedings.

The

designation only, however, is not enough for a subdivision

'''

Id.

^^^

Lalive,

^^^

Id. at 123, 144.
Id.
Delaume, supra note 91,

'''

supra note 189, at 123, 142

at 22.

.
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or agency to consent and accordingly to be a party to the

ICSID proceedings.

Article 25(3) provides that such a

consent requires the approval of a Contracting State that

designates its public entities, unless such a Contracting
State waives its right of approval
It will

normally not be difficult to define the status

of a subdivision or agency of a Contracting State,

since the

Convention requires that they should be designated to ICSID.

Moreover their consent is subject to a Contracting State's
approval unless that State notifies ICSID that approval is
not required.

Such notification will presumably be accepted

as proof of the status as a subdivision or agency.

ICSID Convention,

supra note

4,

Art.

25(3)

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER VI

Today,

international investment is universally

recognized as a factor of crucial importance in the
development of developing countries' economy.

International

investment activities have become one of the essential
features fostering cooperation between developed and

developing countries and its promotion a matter of strong
concern for both parties.
In this regard,

ICSID is to some extent a balanced

international forum that promotes adequate protection for
foreign investors as well as regulates their conduct and
their responsibilities to the public interest.
The beneficial features of the Convention such as the

international dispute settlement mechanism, binding on both

parties award, and perhaps most important, impartial

character of institutional arbitration and conciliation,
have made the Convention and the Centre acceptable to a

growing number of countries.

The use of ICSID clauses has

63
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become widespread in BITs, national investment laws and
codes,

and individual agreements.

However,

ICSID has its constraints too.

issue poses a serious threat to ICSID'

s

The annulment

viability because of

the expansive readings of Article 52 given by several ad hoc

committees.

Solving this problem will require creative

efforts by ICSID administration and understanding by the

Contracting States of the necessity to exclude some of their
annulment rights.
ICSID fills a niche not stressed by other international

dispute resolution institutions by requiring a consent to be

given by the parties to submit a dispute to ICSID and by
limiting the class of participants and the subject matter
jurisdiction.

With regard to consent, arbitration decisions in Alcoa
V.

Jamaica and Amco-Asia

v.

Indonesia stressed out that

counsels to the parties should clearly spell out the

provisions of mutual consent of the parties.

This will

greatly help to avoid the future disputes between the
parties.
The Convention left a definition of the term investment

open to the discretion of the parties.

By so doing,

ICSID

.
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expands its jurisdiction over new forms of investment
disputes.

However,

the notification of a party that it will

not submit a class or classes of the disputes to the ICSID

jurisdiction,

impedes this open construction.

This

provision is an insurance to both parties of investment
agreement and therefore will likely remain.
The jurisdiction of ICSID applies to investment

disputes when the Contracting State, constituent
subdivision, or constituent agency is an actual partner in
an investment project.

The jurisdiction does not apply when

the state's involvement is limited to the exercise of

regulatory controls or other power as an approval authority.
With regard to the investor's legal status, the most
controversial point is an exception that the juridical

person incorporated in the host Contracting State might be

considered as the national of another Contracting State.
ICSID considers this provision as a necessary exception to
the general rule that ICSID will not have jurisdiction over
the disputes involving the Contracting State and its own

nationals
The jurisprudence developed by ICSID with respect to
its own jurisdiction had thus far evolved exclusively in
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cases where the investment agreement contained an ICSID

arbitration clause.

However,

the parties reasonable

reliance on a promise of ICSID arbitration stated in

bilateral investment treaty or national legislation, should
not be frustrated.

By affirming the power of ICSID to

resolve the disputes when parties legitimately relied on
ICSID arbitration, the Centre will realize its goal as a

forum promoting an atmosphere of mutual confidence between

investors and host countries and thus encourage

international investment to the mutual benefit of investors
and host states.
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